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SUMMARY
On 29 April 2009, an imported case of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection was detected in
a London school. As further cases, pupils and staﬀ members were identiﬁed, school closure and
mass prophylaxis were implemented. An observational descriptive study was conducted to
provide an insight into the clinical presentation and transmission dynamics in this setting.
Between 15 April and 15 May 2009, 91 symptomatic cases were identiﬁed: 33 were conﬁrmed
positive for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection; 57 were tested negative; in one the results
were unavailable. Transmission occurred ﬁrst within the school, and subsequently outside. Attack
rates were 2% in pupils (15% in the 11–12 years age group) and 17% in household contacts.
The predominant symptoms were fever (97%), respiratory symptoms (91%), and sore throat
(79%). Limited spread in the school may have been due to a combination of school closure and
mass prophylaxis. However, transmission continued through household contacts to other schools.
Key words : Infection control, infection transmission, outbreaks, respiratory infections, swine-origin
inﬂuenza A H1N1 virus.
INTRODUCTION
The ﬁrst cases of the current global outbreak of
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection were observed
in Mexico and the USA in late April 2009 [1, 2].
Since 1 July 2009, 70 893 cases have been reported
worldwide, including 311 deaths [3]. In the UK, the
ﬁrst conﬁrmed cases were reported on 27 April, and
there were a total of 65 cases detected during the
period 27 April to 11 May [4]. The ﬁrst reports
suggested that pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infections
mainly aﬀect young people and younger adults, and
the infection spreads within households [4].
Children are eﬀective in spreading inﬂuenza virus
[5]. During seasonal inﬂuenza epidemics children
are often the ﬁrst to be aﬀected [5], and especially
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school-aged children have high infection rates [6].
Schools provide a favourable environment for inﬂu-
enza transmission [7], and outbreaks in schools occur
frequently. Moreover, a notable proportion of house-
hold transmission has been attributed to children [8].
Since the beginning of the currently ongoing pan-
demic, several school outbreaks have been reported
around the world [9, 10].
One of the local Health Protection Units (HPU)
in London was alerted on 29 April to potential cases
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus in a mixed school of
1177 pupils in London. Investigations conﬁrmed that
this was the ﬁrst school outbreak with more than one
case in the UK. General infection control practices
and good respiratory and hand hygiene, as well as
self-isolation advice were promulgated widely within
the school. The school was closed during Easter
(15–20 April) and from 2 to 10 May. Mass antiviral
prophylaxis was distributed to pupils and staﬀ on
4 and 5 May.
The aim of this investigation was to analyse and
describe in detail the nature and extent of this out-
break in order to inform the management of this and
other school outbreaks. We also consider the poten-
tial contribution of clinically ill individuals who failed
to be conﬁrmed as cases, but whose illness may have
been caused by pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. The
rationale for including these individuals was the limi-
ted information available on the performance of the
laboratory testing procedures at the time of the in-
vestigation, as well as possible reduced viral shedding
after antiviral prophylaxis.
METHODS
An observational descriptive study was carried out
to describe the outbreak and connections between
cases, and to present them using social mixing maps
in spider diagrams. Data sources included question-
naires completed for each case. These were carried out
as part of the First Few Hundred (FF100) project in
the UK. This was implemented to collect key clinical,
epidemiological, and virological information about
the earliest laboratory-conﬁrmed cases of pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 virus [11]. Active searching and follow-
up of the cases and their close contacts was under-
taken by the HPUs and Health Protection Agency,
Centre for Infections. The study population included
any individual who attended the school as a pupil or
worked there as a staﬀ member between 15 April and
15 May and their close contacts. A close contact, in
accordance with the UK national guidelines at the
time was deﬁned as: any individual who lived in the
same household as the case; or who provided infor-
mal care to the case, coming within speaking distance
(<1 m); or exposed to a case at a distance of <1 m
with continuous exposure for >1 h; or any health-
care or social-care worker who provided direct clini-
cal or personal care or who examined a symptomatic
case. A ‘conﬁrmed’ case (C) was tested positive for
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus RNA; a ‘possible ’ case
(P) was symptomatic with one of a set of symptoms
compatible with an inﬂuenza-like illness and from
whom a combined nose and throat swab could not be
collected but serological test results were pending;
and a ‘symptomatic-negative’ case (S) was sympto-
matic with one of a set of inﬂuenza-like illness symp-
toms but tested negative for inﬂuenza A or pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 virus RNA. The cases had diﬀerent as-
sociations to the school which were deﬁned as: pupil,
teaching staﬀ member, non-teaching staﬀ member
[including health-care workers (HCWs) in the school],
household contact, HCW outside the school, and
social contact. Combined nose and throat swabs were
collected from all individuals with symptoms, and
tested by real-time polymerase chain reaction for in-
ﬂuenza A and B virus RNA. Samples in which inﬂu-
enza A virus RNA was detected were then subtyped
in order to determine whether the inﬂuenza A was
seasonal inﬂuenza subtype H1 or H3. If the virus was
untypable, the sample was referred to conﬁrmation
as pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus RNA by nucleotide
sequence analysis.
RESULTS
A total of 33 conﬁrmed, one possible and 57 sympto-
matic-negative cases having an association with the
school were identiﬁed between 15 April and 15 May.
Conﬁrmed cases became ill between 25 April and
5 May. The attack rate of conﬁrmed cases in pupils
was 2% (3% in boys and 1% in girls) and in staﬀ
members 0.45%. The ﬁrst conﬁrmed case (C4, with
onset on 25 April) was a Year 7 pupil aged 11 who
had travelled abroad in risk areas and who, after
returning to the UK, attended school from 21 to
24 April.
The only two staﬀ members who became conﬁrmed
cases were staﬀ who had cared for pupils who were
ill at school. There were no conﬁrmed cases in the
teaching staﬀ. The ﬁrst case associated with the school
(P1) was a Year 7 pupil aged 13 who had travelled in
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risk areas in April. P1 was unwell upon returning to
the UK and went back to school without symptoms.
P1 remains a possible case, as it was too late to
acquire a respiratory swab at the time of detection.
In addition to C4 and P1, only one other case had a
recent travel history outside the UK (dates unknown).
The school was divided into junior (year groups
Reception to 6) and senior school (year groups 7–13)
with 69 classes, and 1177 pupils. Classrooms of year
groups 7 and 8 were housed in a two-storey Lower
school building separate from other year groups.
There was mixing of year groups 7–11 during lunch
periods. There were 444 staﬀ members ; 158 teaching
staﬀ, and 286 non-teaching staﬀ members of whom
some were working part-time.
Year group 7 (aged 11–12) was the most aﬀected
with an attack rate of 15%. This year group had ﬁve
classes with the following attack rates : 24%, 20%,
13%, 12%, and 8%. The four classes with rates
>10%were all on the upper ﬂoor of the Lower school
building. Only two other year groups (10 and 11) were
aﬀected, and with a low attack rate (1% for both).
The epidemic curve suggests person-to-person
transmission starting inside the school (Fig. 1), ﬁrst
aﬀecting year group 7, thereafter moving on to other
year groups (10 and 11), and ﬁnally with secondary
transmission outside the school (Fig. 1). The attack
rate for conﬁrmed cases in all close contacts was 11%
and that of household contacts 17%. There were four
families where secondary transmission occurred from
pupils. The epidemic curve including both conﬁrmed,
possible, and symptomatic-negative cases (data not
shown) had a similar shape as for conﬁrmed cases
only, and shared the same peak (1 May).
The predominant symptoms (Table 1) were fever
(97%), respiratory symptoms (91%), and sore throat
(79%), with over one third of younger cases (aged
<18 years) reporting diarrhoea or vomiting. All
symptoms presented in Table 1 were signiﬁcantly
more frequent in the conﬁrmed cases. No signiﬁcant
diﬀerence was found between age groups <18 years
and o18 years, except for sneezing which was more
frequent in the latter. None of the conﬁrmed cases
were hospitalized.
A total of 90 individuals (33 conﬁrmed, 57 symp-
tomatic-negative) were swabbed, and 32 (16 con-
ﬁrmed, 16 symptomatic-negative) received oseltamivir
before being swabbed (interval data available only
for 70 individuals of the 90 swabbed). The average
interval from onset of symptoms to swabbing was
fairly short : range 0–10, median 3 days (3 days for
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conﬁrmed, 2 days for symptomatic-negative cases)
(Fig. 2). Four cases were swabbed twice as the ﬁrst
swab result was negative ; for two of them the second
test was positive.
Oseltamivir was oﬀered to 97% of the conﬁrmed
cases and of 88% of the symptomatic-negative. One
conﬁrmed case and 10 symptomatic-negative cases
received oseltamivir before presenting with symp-
toms. The median delay between onset of symptoms
and receiving oseltamivir was 2 days (Fig. 2). Of the
conﬁrmed cases, 11 attended the school on the day
of their illness onset ; and two were at school for
more than 1 day while symptomatic (Fig. 2), before it
was known that their illness was due to pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 virus infection. None of these children
had received oseltamivir prior to the onset of their
symptoms.
Figure 3 shows the 21 conﬁrmed cases in pupils in
the school according to the date of onset of symp-
toms. C4 was an imported case and of the 20 further
cases, 15 had contact in school with another con-
ﬁrmed case ; the number of prior contacts ranged from
1 to 5. For ﬁve cases, no prior clear contact within the
school could be determined. Of the 21 conﬁrmed cases
(Fig. 3), the number of possible onward transmissions
ranged from 0 to 6. Delay between last contact and
onset of symptoms varied from 1 to 8 days. The con-
tribution of other potential intermediary cases along
the chain of transmission cannot be established and
thus the upper limit of the incubation period cannot
be estimated.
Available data allowed linking of all conﬁrmed
cases either through a direct contact with another case
(conﬁrmed or symptomatic-negative) ; through links
from asymptomatic individuals to their conﬁrmed
sibling cases in other classes ; or links to events where
there were associated cases. Figure 4 shows the ﬁve
classes in year group 7 in the centre with their af-
ﬁliated cases, as well as the link between them and
other asymptomatic individuals in other classes,
e.g. year groups 10 and 11. All those classes or year
groups featuring conﬁrmed or symptomatic-negative
cases could be linked with each other. There were
asymptomatic siblings of conﬁrmed cases from year
group 7 in year groups 10 and 11 (C51 and C42).
A total of eight conﬁrmed cases occurred in house-
hold contacts. For one of these cases, the only link to
the school is through a symptomatic-negative case.
Table 1. Symptoms of cases by age group and case status*. Statistical testing for comparison of age groups
was done by Fisher’s exact test and case status groups by x2 test. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus school outbreak
in London
Age group
<18 yr,
conﬁrmed cases
Age group
o18 yr,
conﬁrmed cases
P
value
Total,
conﬁrmed
cases
Total,
symptomatic
negative cases
P
valuen % n % n % n %
Fever 25 96 7 100 n.s. 32 97 44 81 0.02
Respiratory
symptoms
23 88 7 100 n.s. 30 91 28 50 <0.01
Headache 21 81 6 86 n.s. 27 82 21 37 <0.01
Sore throat 20 77 6 86 n.s. 26 79 31 56 0.03
Fatigue 18 69 6 86 n.s. 24 73 5 9 <0.01
Loss of appetite 18 69 4 57 n.s. 22 66 1 3 <0.01
Chills 16 62 3 43 n.s. 19 58 4 14 <0.01
Rhinorrhoea 14 54 5 71 n.s. 19 58 15 26 <0.01
Cough 14 54 6 86 n.s. 20 61 12 22 <0.01
Myalgia 14 54 5 71 n.s. 19 58 5 9 <0.01
Arthralgia 11 42 5 71 n.s. 16 48 3 5 <0.01
Diarrhoea/
vomiting
10 38 1 14 n.s. 11 33 4 7 <0.01
Nausea 8 31 2 29 n.s. 10 31 3 5 <0.01
Sneezing 6 23 5 71 0.03 11 33 n.a. — <0.01
n.s., Not signiﬁcant ; n.a., not available.
* The following clinical manifestations were reported only rarely by cases, and are not shown in the table : dizziness,
conjunctivitis, confusion, shortness of breath, general malaise, blurry vision, stomach pain, nose bleed, and rash.
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Secondary transmission occurred through four pupils
(C4, C39, C15, and C38) to households (Fig. 4). Five
conﬁrmed cases, siblings of pupils, attended four
other schools in London (Fig. 1). In two of these
schools, conﬁrmed tertiary cases were subsequently
identiﬁed (Fig. 4) ; the transmissions occurred from
C4 to C8 and C9 (School X), and from C39 to C58
(School Y).
There were three contacts that provided direct
health care to conﬁrmed cases and became conﬁrmed
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as cases (Fig. 4). There was also a further such indi-
vidual (S86) who was symptomatic and had contact
with conﬁrmed cases, but was found on testing to be
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus-negative.
Investigations suggest the possibility that further
secondary and tertiary transmission of pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 virus may have taken place during a
social event on 25 April. This event was attended by
27 children, of whom 18 were also from year group 7,
and one from year group 11. Three participants (C14,
C39, C45) who were also classmates became con-
ﬁrmed as cases with illness onsets on 29 April, 2 May
and 3 May, respectively. Of note, the possible case
P1 attended the party, but had already recovered at
this time.
DISCUSSION
In this report we describe the ﬁrst school outbreak
involving more than one case of pandemic (H1N1)
2009 virus infection in the UK. The index case in this
outbreak was an imported case returning from a risk
area. Virus transmission occurred both inside the
school, and subsequently in households and health-
care workers. Notably, transmission to two other
schools occurred due to onward transmission through
siblings of the school pupils. Mass antiviral prophy-
laxis and school closure may have contributed to
containment of the outbreak.
There are a number of limitations in this inves-
tigation in terms of quality and completeness of the
data available. Diﬀerent sources were combined to
obtain data. For the conﬁrmed cases, a questionnaire
with closed questions was used, whereas for the
symptomatic-negative cases, data were collected from
several sources, containing more open questions.
Comparison of conﬁrmed and symptomatic-negative
cases is therefore diﬃcult. In addition, parents pro-
vided the information for their children. This may
have inﬂuenced the reliability of the data. For some
individuals only very few data were available about
social contacts.
In our investigation, samples from two conﬁrmed
cases were ﬁrst tested negative. The discrepancies
might be due to several factors, which include timing
of sampling, sampling procedure under ﬁeld con-
ditions, and sample transportation. Of note, a total
of 32 individuals (16 conﬁrmed, 16 symptomatic-
negative) received oseltamivir before being swabbed,
which may have resulted in reduced viral shedding.
The predominant clinical symptoms described in
an earlier study [12] are in line with our results for
conﬁrmed cases. However, we show a lower hos-
pitalization rate, which might be due to diﬀerent
study populations in terms of age distribution and
underlying medical conditions. Some of the diﬀer-
ences between the clinical picture of conﬁrmed and
symptomatic-negative cases may be explained by use
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Fig. 3. Spider diagram showing contacts between conﬁrmed cases by onset of symptoms. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus
school outbreak in London.
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of diﬀerent data sources for these groups, as well as
increased clinical alertness towards the end of the out-
break when most symptomatic-negative cases were
detected.
Previous studies suggest that the majority of the
contacts for school-aged children are with their peers,
which may explain quick spread of inﬂuenza through
certain year groups [13]. In this London school, one
year group was almost exclusively aﬀected. Further,
the only staﬀ members who became conﬁrmed cases
had cared for pupils who were ill, and no conﬁrmed
cases occurred in other staﬀ members who had not
had such close contact with ill pupils. This suggests
that transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus
requires close contact, which is also supported by
studies on seasonal inﬂuenza [14].
Asymptomatic individuals may have played a role
in transmission events in this school setting; however,
this study did not consider the role of random con-
tacts and there may be considerable underreporting
in contacts. Studies on social contact networks of
teenagers and children suggests that the highest risk
for transmission are in households, school classes,
sports, public activity events and through friends,
whereas random contacts can be numerous but have
lower transmission potential [13].
In this outbreak, transmission occurred in four
families. Evidence suggests that shedding of inﬂuenza
virus is more frequent in children than in adults [15]
and transmission of inﬂuenza from adolescents to
adults occurs more frequently than vice versa [16].
Even if children and teenagers are a minority of the
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on 25 April, is not fully detailed in the interests of clarity ; however, the conﬁrmed cases and possible case P1 that did attend
this party are shown in the ellipse. Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus school outbreak in London.
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total population, they are responsible for the majority
of transmission events [16].
Several conﬁrmed cases attended the school while
symptomatic but before realizing their illness was
due to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, which may have
enabled enhanced transmission inside the school be-
fore public health measures could be put in place. This
and other school outbreaks have shown the diﬃculty
in administration of antiviral prophylaxis in a timely
way [17] ; the delay in this outbreak from ﬁrst noti-
ﬁcation of a suspected case at the school to the ad-
ministration of antiviral prophylaxis was 5 days.
Limited spread at the school seems to be explicable by
the fact that the Lower school is quite separate from
the main school as well as by the combined eﬀects of
school closure and antiviral prophylaxis of all school
pupils. Due to the fact the two public health inter-
ventions coincided, it is diﬃcult to assess the true
impact of either of them. It is notable that there was
no evidence of community transmission of pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 virus in London at the time. Our limited
data suggest that oseltamivir may have played a role
in preventing transmission. After prophylaxis was
issued just one conﬁrmed case became ill but there
were 10 symptomatic-negative cases.Modelling studies
have shown that school closure could be eﬀective at
containing transmission in adolescents ; however, it
could also result in increasing household contacts and
outside school activities [13]. This is also supported
by studies carried out with seasonal inﬂuenza [7].
Schools need to be prepared for pandemic inﬂuenza
before they open after the summer break. Prompt
notiﬁcation of cases is important to allow early de-
tection of school outbreaks and implementation of
public health measures. There are existing pandemic
inﬂuenza plans that schools should activate. These
plans should include advice to teachers and aﬃliated
health-care professionals on the use of face masks
and or personal protective equipment, on establish-
ment of coherent triage systems and side-rooms to
cohort infected students. Furthermore, schools need
to be prepared to swiftly communicate clear respirat-
ory and hand hygiene and self-isolation to pupils
and parents, through, e.g. posters and the internet.
Materials should include expected scenarios and how
to deal with them. Further work is needed to better
deﬁne conditions under which the pandemic (H1N1)
2009 virus may transmit in a school setting and house-
holds, including comparison of school outbreaks,
modelling of contacts, and assessing the possible role
of asymptomatic transmission.
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